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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
I. INTRODUCTION

An American firm, which had purchased tiles from an Italian company,
filed a complaint against the seller for breach of contract. The seller answered
the claim relying on certain terms and provisions that appeared on the reverse
of a preprinted form contract used for the sale that allowed the seller to stop
deliveries in case the buyer failed to pay. The buyer presented affidavits from
its president and from two employees of the seller stating that the parties did
not intend to be bound by the standard terms on the order form. The district
court excluded this evidence on the basis of the domestic parol evidence rule
and granted summary judgment to the seller.2 The decision was reversed on
appeal,3 but the case presents a good example of how problematic the strict
application of the common law parol evidence rule in a modem interconnected
world may be. From the point of view of the civil law tradition, the crux of the
problem will be the evidence of the truthfulness of the alleged fact, in
accordance with the general rules of interpretation of contracts contained in
specific dispositions of a code, and not a general restriction of extrinsic proof
developed by varied and conflictive jurisprudence.
Farnsworth affirms that the parol evidence rule is "universally
recognized";4 however, its acceptance is limited to the common law world, and
even there sometimes the rule is viewed with disfavor.5 Beyond the frontiers
of the common law and some mixed jurisdictions, the parol evidence rule is
virtually unknown.
This comparative study has two objectives. First, the Article seeks to
demonstrate how different legal families resolve the same problem. To this
end, this Article compares methodologies for resolving the question of framing
the parties' real intent in a contract in common law jurisdictions, in mixed
jurisdictions, and in the civil law tradition. The comparison will review the
evolution of the rule in the domestic jurisdictions and consider the way the rule
responded to the modem needs of international commercial law. Second, this
Article offers an analysis of the path selected by modem international
commercial law for resolving the problems related with extrinsic evidence
varying or contradicting a writing. The recent opinion rendered on this
2 MCC - Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino S.p.A., No. 92-2108-

CIV (S.D. Fla.); see also infra Part IV.A.
' See MCC - Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino S.p.A., 144 F.3d
1384 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
4 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 415 (4th ed. 2004).
1 See infra Part III.B.1.
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specific rule by the Advisory Council on the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods6 is especially striking and demonstrates that the
conflict continues on the use of the parol evidence rule when the parties are in
different jurisdictions.7 This Article concludes that the manifold sources of
information brought about by advancements in modem technology, as well as
a coincident expansion in communications and electronic commerce,
necessitate a reconsideration of the rule as it was originally conceived in the
common law. A comparison of the domestic parol evidence rule with its
equivalents as they have evolved in foreign and international legal spheres
clearly reveals the need for adopting a more flexible approach in keeping with
current times.

II.

THE RULE

The parol evidence rule belongs to the common law tradition. It provides
that a written instrument, intended by the parties thereto as the final
manifestation of their mutual understanding, cannot be challenged by past or
contemporary evidence contradicting it or modifying its content.8
The roots of the parol evidence rule in the common law originated at the
end of the Middle Ages, when the custom was adopted of stamping a written
agreement of the parties with a seal so as to make its authenticity indisputable. 9
The rule also could be found latent in the reluctance of a sixteenth-century
English court to construe a written will using evidence extrinsic to it. I° In
6 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,

1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-99 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
See infra Part IVA.] for a discussion of the advisory opinion.
8 For similar definitions see, for example, FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.3.
9 See John H. Wigmore, A BriefHistory of the ParolEvidenceRule, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 338,
342 (1904). For the first American cases see THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 168 (Philadelphia, Abraham Small 1824).
0 See Sharington v. Strotton, (1565) 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (K.B.) (holding that a sealed
document is of a higher nature than other evidence). In The Lord Cheyney's case, (1591) 77
Eng. Rep. 158 (Ct. Wards), the court said: "for it would be full of great inconvenience that none
should know by the written words of a will what construction to make or advice to give, but it
should be controlled by collateral averments out of the will." However, a few years later in
Burglacy v. Ellington, 1 Brownl. & Golds. 192, the court decided "when a deed is perfect and
delivered as his deed, that then no verbal agreement afterwards may be pleaded in destruction
thereof ... but when the agreement is parcel of the original contract, as here it is, it may be
pleaded." J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 270 (2d ed. 1979),

mentions that already in the fifteenth century there was no way to overturn by oral evidence what
was considered a valid deed. See also Donne v. Cornwalle, Y.B. 14 Hen. 7, Hil. 1,pl. 2 (1486).
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those times, the existence of documents replaced the system of proving
transactions by witnesses. The next historical step was in 1677 with the
"Statute of Frauds,""1 which required that some specific contracts be in
writing. With the passing of time, reading and writing was no longer a
"mysterious art of a few," 12 and consequently, written contracts became the
rule rather than the exception. Thereafter, the parol evidence rule began
acquiring its modem form and started to spread in the common law, turning the
writing itself into the agreement, rather than only a way to prove its existence.
According to one well-known decision, the rule ought to promote legal
certainty. 3 Corbin mentions preventing fraud and perjury, as well as
contributing to the determination of justice and truth by a legal device. 4
Furthermore, the rule was deemed to help the interpreter by allowing him to
rely on the terms of a written agreement and to exclude unreliable or dishonest
evidence.' 5 The well-intentioned purposes of the rule, however, have not
'6
prevented criticism of it as a "source of endless confusion in contract law.'
Indeed, the countless number of exceptions to the rule found in common law
jurisprudence have produced the unintentional effect of undermining the
original principle."'
The rule has been justified at common law using two different
approaches. 8 The first relates to the parties' consent: the parties intend to
make the writing an expression of their final agreement that supersedes all

" Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677) (Eng.). Its misleading name was derived from its
first line, which explains that it was issued for the "prevention of many Fraudulent Practices
which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury." Id.
However, Jean Brissaud mentions that, as early as 1566, the Ordinance of Moulins made
mandatory written contracts in France when the value involved was greater than 100 pounds.
Proof by witnesses was not allowed beyond that worth. JEAN B. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF
FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 613 (Rapelje Howell trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1968) (1912).
12 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 175 (6th ed. 1938).
"3See Shore v. Wilson, (1842) 8 Eng. Rep. 450.
14 See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 575 (1960).
"5See BRIAN BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 308 (1998). In England,
"parol evidence will not be admitted to prove that some particular term, which had been verbally
agreed upon, had been omitted (by design or otherwise) from a written instrument constituting
a valid and operative contract between the parties." Jacobs v. Batavia & Gen. Plantations Trust
Ltd., [1924] 1 Ch. 287.
16 See Note, The ParolEvidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 972, 972 (1969).
17Id. at 974 n. 11. See also Zell v. Am. Seating Co., 138 F.2d. 641, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1943),
rev'd, 322 U.S. 709 (1944) (describing confusion resulting from the rule's exception).
IS See both approaches in JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 234 (4th
ed. 1999).
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prior understandings, and that final understanding must be honored by the
interpreter. The second approach regards the quality of evidence: a final
writing carefully drafted to reflect the parties' intention deserves a better and
preferred rank as proof than any other prior or contemporary agreement
between the parties.
The relation between the parol evidence rule and interpretation is evident.
When the parties in a claim introduce any written instrument, the words,
expressions, terms, and usages of the document must be interpreted by the
tribunal. When the parties have expressed their intent in an ambiguous way,
despite the fact that the agreement was considered the final representation of
their intention, the court must rely on the words selected to resolve the
ambiguity. Sometimes it is difficult to be sure that the meaning of a document
can be established by considering only that document. 9 The parties have
chosen the words and made the instrument, but the result sometimes does not
reflect their intentions properly. Just as Corbin explained: "Its legal operation
must be in accordance with the meaning that the words convey to the court, not
the meaning that they intend to convey. 20
The distinction between latent andpatent ambiguities, used in the United
States for respectively accepting oral evidence or curing the obscurity only
with the writing, has been seen as discredited.2' Is there any other rule to be
considered for explaining when the judicial interpreter will read a word written
in the contract as plain and evident and when will it be seen as ambiguous? In
spite of appearing unambiguous and plain to the reader, the words used in the
contract sometimes do not exactly explain what the author truly means.22
," E. Allan Farnsworth, The Interpretation of International Contracts and the Use of
Preambles, INT'L Bus. L.J., No. 3-4, 2002, at 271, 275; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
2 Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretationof Words and the ParolEvidence Rule, 50 CORNELL
L.Q. 161, 161 (1964). According to Corbin, the court must put itself "in the shoes" of the
parties. Id. at 162.
21 James P. McBaine, The Rule Against DisturbingPlain Meaning of Writings, 31 CAL. L.
REV. 145, 147 (1943) (referring to Bacon's rule); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1898).
22 See, e.g., Baine v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 129 P.2d 396 (1942); see McBaine, supra note
21, at 156 (explaining the contradiction with the Code of Civil Procedure). Compare Bulmer
v. Bollinger, [ 1974] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1234 (Lord Denning enumerating guidelines for the judge
determined to interpret a treaty germane for somebody deciding between a writing and a statute),
with Lord Hoffmann's opinion in Investors Comp. Scheme v. West Bromwich Bldg. Soc'y,
[1998] 1All E.R. 98, 114-15, availableat http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 199798/
ldjudgmt/jd970619/invest01.htm (summarizing the current principles of interpretation of
contractual documents).
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Extrinsic evidence could be helpful to the interpreter for understanding that
meaning unless the parol evidence rule prohibited it.
III. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS
A. The Rule in the United States
In the United States, the duty of clarifying the increasing number of
overlapping precedents of the parol evidence rule was entrusted, among other
subject matters, to the American Law Institute. The general rules, or
"Restatement" prepared by the Institute, affirm that the rule is not a rule of
interpretation, but rather defines the theme of the interpretation.23 If the
instrument is a complete expression of the parties' understanding, the
agreement is said to be "integrated." 24 If the writing produced is not complete,
though a final instrument, the writing can be complemented, but not
contradicted, by additional evidence. This is a case of "partial integration."
To determine that the instrument executed by the parties is final and complete,
courts sometimes use the "four corners" rule.25 This approach consists of
gathering all information related to the interpretation of the contract from
within the document itself and not from extrinsic sources.2 6 At other times, the
interpreter looks for a merger clause. This expression alludes to a provision
of the contract stating that the writing is the final and complete agreement of
the parties, which establishes in a definitive way that the document embodies
the total and integrated agreement reached. The concept of "total integration"
is the one regarded by some scholars as the major area of conflict of the rule.2 7

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (1981).
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 418-20.
25 See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 1989)
23 RESTATEMENT
24

(explaining the "four corners" rule).
26 However, this method lost part of its original strict interpretation, which prevented juries
from disregarding evidence outside the four corners of the contract.
27 See JEFFREY THOMAS FERRIELL & MICHAEL J. NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 280
(2004). Concerning the different understandings between Professors Williston and Corbin, see
John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and
Principlesof ContractInterpretation,42 IND. L.J. 333,337 (1967). In Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E.
646 (N.Y. 1928), the court admitted extrinsic evidence of an oral agreement made prior to the
written contract when this agreement was not so clearly connected with the principal transaction
as to be part and parcel of it. In Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), the court first
accepted the evidence of a prior contract as credible for concluding that the written instrument
was not fully integrated. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS INTHE
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The relationship between integrated agreements and prior understandings
are summarized in § 213 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements
to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior
agreements to the extent that they are within its scope.
(3) An integrated agreement that is not binding or that is voidable
and avoided does not discharge a prior agreement. But an
integrated agreement, even though not binding, may be effective
to render inoperative a term which would have been part of the
agreement if it had not been integrated.2"
The Restatement also reproduces the prevailing opinion that evidence of prior
or contemporaneous negotiations is to be admitted to prove that the written
agreement was not intended by the drafters as the final expression of the terms
it contains.29
Efforts among the states for promotion of uniform legislation governing
private transactions were finalized in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).3 ° Its ratification as statute, with some variances, by forty-nine states
of the Union seeks to promote the uniform understanding and interpretation of
some specific legal areas of commercial transactions, including sales. The
process restated by the U.C.C. has been praised for overcoming much of the
confusion of the past and offering an effective guide to the courts." According
to the U.C.C., the operation of the parol evidence rule depends on the intention
of both parties that the writing would be the final expression of their
agreement. The first step in determining this may be to ascertain whether the
writing has reached the required level to be considered the final expression.

LAW OF CONTRACTS 100, 105 (5th ed. 2006). In Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451
F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971), in the opinion of the court, the defendant should have been allowed to
introduce evidence of trade usages. Course of dealing and trade usage, unless carefully negated,
are admissible to supplement the terms of any writing. The contract should be read on the
assumption that these elements were taken for granted when it was drafted.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (198 1).
29 Id. § 214.
3" See U.C.C. (1977). For the origin of the U.C.C., see the site of the National Conference

ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp (last visited
Apr. 3, 2007).
3' JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 450 (4th ed. 2001).
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One of the distinctive features of the U.C.C. as compared with the Restatement
is that the former avoids all mentions of "integration." The U.C.C. identifies
writings as either "complete and exclusive," which cannot be supplemented
with additional evidence, or "final expression," which can be.32 If a record is
final, but not complete and exclusive, it can be supplemented with other
evidence drawn from any source of consistent additional terms. Additionally,
the U.C.C. underlines the significance of prior commercial dealings between
the parties or usages of trade for explaining contractual terms.33
It should be recalled that the Restatement and the U.C.C. do not replace the
understanding of the rule under the still operative and above-mentioned
principles of the common law. Subsequently, the American development of
the rule will be compared with its evolution in England, where the principle
originated, as well as its equivalents in other common law traditions. The
comparison will show how the rule has been reformed in most common law
jurisdictions by a gradual process, which has diluted considerably part of its
original content, leading one to wonder about its survival.
B. Other Members of the Common Law Tradition
1. England
In 1897 in England, Lord Morris explained the rule in conspicuous terms:
"[p]arol testimony cannot be received to contradict, vary, add to or substract

32 U.C.C. § 2-202 (2003).

Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence. (1) Terms with
respect to which the confirmatory records of the parties agree or which are
otherwise set forth in a record intended by the parties as afinalexpression of
their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement but may be supplemented by evidence of: (a) course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade (Section 1-303); and (b)
consistent additional terms unless the court finds the record to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement. (2) Terms in a record may be explained by evidence of course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a preliminary
determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous.
Id. (emphasis added).
" See Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1985); Rose Stone
& Concrete, Inc. v. County of Broome, 429 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
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from the terms of a written contract, or the terms in which the parties have
deliberately agreed to record any part of their contract."3
In 1972, Lord Denning, in a minority opinion, affirmed that in the event the
contract is unclear, the parties are "the very best guides to the way in which it
was used."35 Later, the House of Lords admitted extrinsic evidence as proof
of the background or "matrix of facts" of the agreement when this background
was known by the parties at the time of the contract.36 In England, the parol
evidence rule was strictly applied in relation with the non-admission of the
subsequent conduct of the parties for construing the terms of a written
contract. 37 The English Law Commission in charge of the modernization of
the law in England, in a first paper produced in 1976, recommended that the
rule should be abolished.38 However, ten years later, in 1986, 39 the same
Commission pointed out that the several and extensive exceptions admitted to
the rule by current jurisprudence allowed one to wonder whether the rule had
not been in fact largely destroyed."n The presumption that the document,
which seems to be the contract, as a matter of fact, is the whole contract has
less strength today than in prior times. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that
today in England the parol evidence restriction will preclude a party, for
example, from bringing extrinsic evidence of terms which were intended to be
part of the agreement." Some scholars recognize here the Victorian character
of the English law of contracts and its lack of adaptation to the requirement of

3' Bank of Australasia v. Palmer, [ 1897] A.C. 540, 545. See the rule stated by Lawrence in
Jacobs v. Batavia & General PlantationsTrust Ltd., [1924] 1 Ch. 287. See also Rabin v.
Gerson Berger Ass'n, [1986] 1 All E.R. 374.
" Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd. v. Schuler A.G., (1972) 2 All E.R. 1173, 1181 (C.A.),
aff'd, [1974] A.C. 235 (H.L.).
36 This is the oft-quoted expression of Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v. Simmonds, [ 1971] 3 All
E.R. 237, 1 W.L.R. 1381, 1383-84.
17 See Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd., (1974) A.C. at 261. However, Lord Steyn
suggests the reexamination of the rule in Johan Steyn, Address, The IntractableProblem of the
Interpretationof Legal Texts, 25 SYDNEY L. REv. 5, 10 (2003).
38 The ParolEvidence Rule (English Law Comm'n, Working Paper No. 70, 1976).
3' The Parol Evidence Rule (English Law Comm'n, Working Paper No. 154, 1986).
However, see the comment ofJohn W. Carter, The ParolEvidence Rule: The Law Commission 's
Conclusions, 1 J. CONT. L. 33 (1988), narrowing the concept of parol evidence used by the
commissioners.
40

See MICHAEL H. WHINCUP, CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE: THE ENGLISH SYSTEM AND

CONTINENTAL COMPARISONS (4th ed. 2001); KIM LEWISON, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS 34-37 (1989). Butcf G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 177-85 (8th ed. 1991)

(enumerating thirteen main exceptions to the rule accepted by the jurisprudence).
41 EwAN McKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW 113 (1990).
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a global contractual society.42 In the birthplace of the rule, the parol evidence
principle has begun to show its rifts.
In addition, it should be recalled that until recently the United Kingdom has
been reluctant to sign the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG).43 As explained later in this Article, the CISG will oblige the
English courts to reconsider their rules on interpretation in relation to
international contracts for the purpose of reaching the desired harmonization
with other member states. This search for uniformity will impede the use of
rules characteristic of one legal system but unknown to other legal traditions.
2. Australia
The English origin of the Australian legal system is apparent from its
organization and influence in Australia's colonial period.' The pattern shows
evident similarities with England, and the Australian courts closely followed
the most important decisions of the House of Lords despite no longer being
bound by English precedents.4 5
In Australia, the application of the rule has been seen as unavoidable unless
the claimant proves that the written document was not intended to embody the
whole contract. 46 The courts have presumed that a written contract that
appears to be complete contains all the terms of the agreement, and prior or
contemporary evidence will not be admitted to add to or vary its terms.47 Some
authors have observed that, in practice, the exclusion contained in such an
understanding of the parol evidence rule is less severe than it seems, and
consequently, Australian courts have admitted several exceptions of the rule
following the pattern initiated in England, but maintaining some appreciable
differences. For example, the subsequent conduct of the parties cannot be used
in England with the objective of interpreting the prior written contract, but in
42

See ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONTRACT LAW: THEMES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

159-61 (2001) (referring to the discussion concerning the ratification by England of the CISG).
41 See Angelo Forte, The UnitedNationsConvention on Contractsfor the International
Sale
of Goods: Reason and Unreason in the UnitedKingdom, 26 U. BALT. L. REv. 51 (1997).
44 See Louis WALLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 3 5 (8th ed. 2000); J.M. BENNETT & ALEX
CASTLES, A SOURCE BOOK OF AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 248 (1979).

41 See Australia Act 1986, 1985 (abolishing the Judicial Committee ofthe Privy Council and
leaving the High Court of Australia as the last instance of appeals); Statute of Westminster
Adoption Act 1942, 1942 (giving Australia full legal autonomy).
46 See Gordon v. McGregor (1909) 8 C.L.R. 316.
47 See, e.g., Mercantile Bank of Sydney v. Taylor (1891) 12 L.R. (N.S.W.) 252,262, aft'd,
[1893] A.C. 317.
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Australia, ulterior behavior of the contractual parties has been seen as relevant
to elucidate the contract when its terms were doubtful.4" The High Court
discussed the admission of extrinsic evidence in a well-known case.49 In his
opinion, Judge Mason affirmed that "[t]he true rule is that evidence of
surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the
contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible to more than one
meaning."5 But it is not acceptable to contradict the contract language when
it has a plain meaning. The intentions of the parties are superseded by the
contract itself."
It should be noted that Australia has ratified the CISG. Beyond the
relevance of the Convention for amalgamating different legal traditions, the
application of the parol evidence rule is deemed incompatible with the
worldwide interpretation required by the CISG.52 An example of this
incompatibility could be seen in the case of South Sydney District Rugby
League v. News Ltd., where the implications of the terms based upon the
presumed or imputed intentions of the parties were discussed.53 The judge
mentioned in passing that "notwithstanding the supposed uncertainty in
defining the concept of good faith and fair dealing.. ." this circumstance "has

" See Farmer v. Honan (1919) 26 C.L.R. 183, 197; Air Great Lakes Pty. Ltd. v. K.S. Easter
(Holdings) Pty. Ltd. (1985) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 309. But see FAI Traders Insurance Company v.
Savoy PlazaPly. Limited(1993) 2 V.R. 343, where the Supreme Court of Victoria resolved that
in its opinion, Australian law at present does not permit reliance on subsequent conduct. See
JOHN W. CARTER & D.J. HARLAND, CONTRACT LAW IN AUSTRALIA 228-30 (3d ed. 1996).
41 Codelfa Constr. Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Auth. of New South Wales (1982) 149 C.L.R. 337
(ratified by the High Court in Royal Botanic Gardens & Domain Trust v. South Sydney City
Council (2002) 186 A.L.R. 289, 293).
50 Codelfa Constr. Pty. Ltd. (1982) 149 C.L.R. at 352.
"' See Carter, supra note 39, at 37. On the other hand, the rule explained in Prenn v.
Simmonds, [1971] 3 All E.R. 237, 1 W.L.R. 1381, had been admitted as applicable. The courts
in Australia are allowed to admit evidence of surrounding circumstances in the case of mutually
known facts, but they cannot admit evidence from only one party's intentions. See DTR
Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. Mona Homes Pty. Ltd. (1978) 138 C.L.R. 423, 429.
52 See Gabriel A. Moens, Lisa Cohn & Darren Peacock, Australia, in A NEW APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (M.J. Bonell ed., 1999) (affirming that Section 66A of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 provides that the CISG takes precedence over provisions of the Trade
Practices Act, as well as providing that where the Act would apply were it not for a term in the
contract, the term is overridden and the Act applies). The Trade Practices Act 1974 is available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consolact/tpal 974149/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
" S. Sydney Dist. Rugby League Football Club Ltd. v. News Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1541.
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not deterred every State and Territory legislature in this country from enacting
into domestic law the provisions of [the CISG]." 54
3. Canada
With the exception of Qudbec," the law of Canada followed English law,
and the decisions of the House of Lords were considered binding on the
Canadian tribunals. 6 Prior to 1949, it was possible to appeal a decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada to the Privy Council in London.57 This procedure
no longer exists, and the Supreme Court of Canada is the country's highest
appellate court.58
Canadian jurisprudence supported the parol evidence rule as a device to
avoid injustice,59 following a pattern understood as more consistent with the
original rule in comparison to the current, flexible English approach. 0
Evidence of surrounding circumstances has been admitted to clarify
ambiguities already existing at the time of contracting.6 However, the
Supreme Court of Canada has been reluctant to allow proof of collateral
agreements and less prepared to permit the parties to evade the consequences
of a written understanding.62 As it happened in England and in Australia, some
questions in Canada have arisen with the introduction of evidence by a party
in order to establish the meaning of the contract understood in a certain way.63

Id. para. 393.3.
" See infra Part III.C.4.
56 See BORA LASKIN, THE
14

BRITISH TRADITION IN CANADIAN LAW 60 (1969).
" In 1949, the Supreme Court Act was amended to make the Supreme Court of Canada the
last court of appeal in Canada. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26 § 52 (1985), availableat
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/CS/S-26///en.
s LASKIN, supra note 56, at 67.
See Hayward v. Mellick, [1982] 23 R.P.R. 265, 269 (Ont. H.C.), rev'd, [1984] 2 O.A.C.
391 (Ont. C.A.).
60 S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAWOFCONTRACTS 233 (2d ed. 1984) (referring to the status of the
signed writing: "The attempt of the courts to secure certainty has led to their affording a kind of
sanctity to contractual documents").
61 G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN CANADA 458 (3d ed. 1994).
62 Id. at 461. See Bauer v. Bank of Montreal, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 102; Carman Constr. Ltd. v.
Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 958. Both of these cases follow Hawrish v. Bank of
Montreal, [1969] S.C.R. 515, where an obligee sought to propose parol evidence of an oral
agreement not included in the writing. The Supreme Court of Canada applied the parol evidence
rule impeding the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
63 Black Bros. Realty Ltd. v. 254929 Bank of Montreal, [1989] 67 Alta. L.R.2d 268 (Alta.
C.A.) (upholding the validity of a quit claim deed); see also Auto. Renault Canada Ltd. v.
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Canadian courts have been less inclined to allow a contractual party to invoke
an oral statement that may modify the strictness of the contracts." On the
other hand, they have been receptive to accepting the subsequent conduct of
the parties for interpreting the contract.6 5 It should be mentioned that the
recent enactment of legislation in all Canadian provinces related to business
practices and consumer protection has increasingly restricted the application
of the exclusion rule.66
The CISG was implemented in Canada on May 1, 199267 and since then has
been transformed into law in all provinces and territories. 68 The recent
Canadian jurisprudence on the CISG has shown a certain reluctance to
recognize the use of the Convention. 69 This reluctance was usually shown by
considering and applying domestic law despite the fact that the case was
clearly governed by the CISG.70 However, there are exceptions, and, for

Maritime Import Autos. Ltd., [1961] 31 D.L.R.2d 592 (N.S.S.C.) (admitting evidence in case
of ambiguous language).
64 FRIDMAN, supra note 61, at 461. But see Johnson Invs. Ltd. v. Pagratide, [1923] 2
W.W.R. 736 (Alta. C.A.) (admitting an oral agreement that payment would not be enforced until
a subsequent date in an action for foreclosure and sale in accordance with a written contract).
65 SeeBankofMontrealv. Univ. of Sask., [1953] 9 W.W.R. (N.S.) 193, 199; Manitoba Dev.
Corp. v. Columbia Forest Prods. Ltd., [1974] 2 W.W.R. 237 (Man. C.A.); CHMI/CKDS v.
Telemedia Commc'ns Inc., [1988] 40 B.L.R. 223, 242.
66 See, e.g., Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C., ch. 2, § 187 (2004),
available at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/B/04002O00.htm.
§ 187. In a proceeding in respect of a consumer transaction, a provision in a
contract or a rule of law respecting parole or extrinsic evidence does not
operate to exclude or limit the admissibility of evidence relating to the
understanding of the parties as to the consumer transaction or as to a
particular provision of the contract.
The drafting is similar in other Canadian provinces. See also David W. Scott, The Parol
Evidence Rule - A Litigator'sPerspective: Will the Cummunings of the PartiesBe Received in
Evidence?, in SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA: LAW IN TRANSITION:
CONTRACTS 87, 90 (1984).
67 International Sale of Goods Contracts Convention Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 13 (Can.), available

at http://www.yorku.ca/osgoode/cisg/legis/canen.htm.
68 See list ofacts available at http://www.yorku.ca/osgoode/cisg/legislation.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2007).
69 See Rajeev Sharma, The UnitedNations Convention on Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods: The Canadian Experience, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 847, 858
(2005).
7 See, e.g., Nova Tool & Mold, Inc. v. London Indus., Inc., [1998] O.J. 5381 (O.C.J. Dec.
16, 1998), available at http://www.yorku.ca/osgoode/cisg/cases/novatool.htm; see also GreCon
Dimter, Inc. v. J.R. Normand, Inc., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 401 (containing no discussion of the CISG
even though the parties were in different contracting states and CISG was applicable).
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example, in Diversitel Communications v. Glacier, Judge Toscano applied
principles of the CISG related to fundamental breach and lack of observation
of a specific delivery schedule.7
4. New Zealand
New Zealand was a dependent dominion of England until 1947 when the
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act was enacted.72 The Supreme Court of
New Zealand was established in 2003, ending the appeals to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in England.73
The original British rules excluding evidence of the parties' negotiations
before the contract and evidence of post-contractual behavior were initially
followed by the courts of New Zealand.7 4 New Zealand's Contractual
Remedies Act of 1979 applies to contracts in force after April 1, 1980 and
affirms that a merger clause in a contract will not prevent a court from
inquiring into further evidence of the position of the parties." Despite the
report of the drafting committee stating that the Act is not intended to affect
the parol evidence rule,76 in fact, it did. Under the Act, a claimant may recover
damages for misrepresentation in spite of the misrepresentation not being
recorded in the writing as if it were a term.77 However, this Act does not apply
to all contracts, and the parol evidence rule continues to exist, although with
the several exceptions recognized by English law.78

7

See Diversitel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Glacier Bay, Inc., [2004] 181 O.A.C. 6, available at

http://www.yorku.ca/osgoode/cisg/cases/diversitel.htm.
72 See Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947, 1947 S.N.Z. No. 38 (adopting Statute of
Westminster 1931, 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, §§ 2-6 (U.K.), as of Nov. 25, 1947).
13 See Supreme Court Act 2003, 2003 S.N.Z. No. 53, available at http://www.legislation.
govt.nz/browse-vw.asp?content-set=pal-statutes (follow "Supreme Court Act 2003" hyperlink
in statutory database).
14 J.F. NORTHEY, CHESHIRE AND FIFOOT's LAW OF CONTRACT 114 (6th New Zealand ed.
1984) (mentioning Roberts v. Indep. Publishers Ltd., [ 1974] 1N.Z.L.R. 459; Herriott v. Crofton
Holdings Ltd., [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 383).
71 Contractual Remedies Act 1979, 1979 S.N.Z. No. 11, § 4(1), available at http://www.
legislation.govt.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=palstatutes (follow "Contractual Remedies Act
1979" hyperlink in statutory database).
76

FRANCIS DAWSON& DAVID W. McLAUCHLAN, THE CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES ACT 1979,

at41 (1981).
77Id.at 42.
7' NORTHEY, supra note 74, at 114 n.9 (mentioning that the effect of the Contractual
Remedies Act 1979 on the parol evidence rule is disputed).
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The CISG went into effect in New Zealand in 1995, 79 and some of the
subsequent jurisprudence relates to the questions being researched here. An
example of the possible conflict of interpretation may be shown by the
dissenting opinion of Judge Thomas in Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf
Judge Thomas was convinced that the parties'
International Ltd.s0
negotiations and draft agreements must be admitted by the court if reliable
extrinsic evidence were available to confirm the parties' intentions.81 In
Attorney-General & NZ Rail Corporationv. Dreux Holdings Ltd.,2 the court
analyzed whether the subsequent conduct of the parties may help to interpret
the contract and decided that taking account of it was an established
international practice and accepted by the CISG.8 3
5. Summary of the Common Law
In summary, the persistence of the parol evidence rule in common law
systems has been restricted to written contracts representing the entire
memorandum of the parties' intent, and even in those cases, some jurisdictions
have abolished the rule. The effect of the CISG has also been anticipated in
the jurisprudence of those common law countries that are part of the
Convention. The following Part will discuss the rule in some representative
jurisdictions of mixed origin where the prohibition had been submitted to the
centripetal forces of both common and civil law traditions. The analysis in this
Part will try to delve deeper into the differences already identified in the
common law and its counterparts in the Roman family.

9 See Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994, 1994 S.N.Z. No. 60.
80 Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf Int'l Ltd., [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.), rev'd, [2004] 1
N.Z.L.R. 1 (S.C.); see also Henning Lutz, The CISG and Common Law Courts:Is There Really
a Problem?, 35 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 711, 726 n.81 (2004).
S Yoshimoto, [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 538-49, paras. 59-95. In Potter v. Potter [2003] 3
N.Z.L.R. 145 (C.A.), aff'd, [2005] 2 N.Z.L.R.1 (S.C.), Judge Thomas' interpretation was
rebutted.
82 Attorney-Gen. & NZ Rail Corp. v. Dreux Holdings Ltd., [1996] 7 T.C.L.R. 617 (C.A.);
see also David McLauchlan, A Contract Contradiction,30 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
175, 192 (1999).
83 Petra Butler, CelebratingAnniversaries,36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 775, 776

(2005).
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C. Mixed Jurisdictions
A legal system where the components of the common law tradition and the
civil law heritage, as well as other legal legacies are combined could be
identified as mixed." Two mixed jurisdictions are compared in this Part:
Louisiana and Scotland. Both are rooted in the civil law family and both fight
for survival in a common law environment; however, these jurisdictions have
produced different results. Finally, South Africa and Qudbec also merit some
reference.
1. Louisiana
Louisiana is the only state in the United States of America where a
substantial part of the original French and Spanish civil law local tradition has
been preserved. The codification of the parol evidence rule in Louisiana dates
back to the first civil digest. The English version of Article 242 of the Digest
of Louisiana of 1808 stated: "Neither shallparolevidence be admitted against
or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been said
before, or at the time of making the said acts or since."85 This text, contained
in the Compiled Edition of the Louisiana Civil Code by the Louisiana State
Law Institute, translated as "parol evidence" what the original French version
taken from the Code Napoleon mentioned as "preuvepar t~moins," which
could have been more accurately translated as "proof by witnesses." The
implication of this misleading translation from the original French has not been
corrected in further versions of the text.86 Article 242 was reproduced as
Article 2256 in the 1825 version of the Louisiana Civil Code,87 and as Article

4 See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and
Uncodified), 4 REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME [UNIFORM L. REv.] 591 (1999), availableat http://
www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/I 999-3.htm.
85 Articles were not correlative in that Code. The accurate quotation of the cited text is
Louis MOREAU-LISLET & JAMES BROWN, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, Book III, tit. III, ch. 6, § 2, art. 242 (1808) [hereinafter Article 242].

For the French text with annotations and the English translation, see A REPRINT OF MOREAULISLET'S COPY OF A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS

(1808 de la Vergne Volume) 205, 310 (1968).
86 For examples of substitutions of other terms in the former drafting, as well as a synopsis
of the common law forays into the Louisiana Civil Code, see Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the
Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REv. 301, 309 (1998).
87 The 1825 text is slightly different from that of Article 242 of 1808, replacing the phrase
"the said acts" with the single word "them."
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2276 in the 1870 revised Civil Code, 8 which remained valid until its revision
in 1985. In the current Civil Code, the former text may be recognized in
Article 1848, although now modified. This article states:
Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate or
vary the contents of an authentic act or an act under private
signature. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, that evidence
may be admitted to prove such circumstances as a vice of
consent, or a simulation, or to prove that the written act was
modified by a subsequent and valid oral agreement.8 9
From the plain text, it is clear that not just witnesses, but also any other
evidence, is included in the prohibition when the evidence is intended to
negate or vary the content of an act, whether authentic or private. That which
is protected is the "content" of the "act." 90 Parol evidence is then admissible
in those cases where the terms of the written contract are susceptible to more
than one interpretation, in other cases where there is uncertainty or ambiguity
as to the terms, or finally in those cases where the language used does not
allow the court to ascertain the intent of the parties.9 1
Louisiana jurisprudence generally recognizes that the parol evidence rule
excludes only oral testimony and does not extend to extrinsic writings that
emphasize the oral aspect of the expression. 92 Although the rule is codified as
a prohibition, exceptions to the rule are numerous as they are in other common
law jurisdictions. Several exceptions to the parol evidence rule recognized by
Louisiana jurisprudence in fact were related to evidentiary aspects of the
consent given by one of the parties. 93 This happened with cases where the

88 The article number was vacated by the amendment and reenactment of Titles III and IV
of 1984 La. Acts 331, § 1, effective Jan. 1, 1985.
89 LA. CIv. CODE art. 1848 (1973).
90 Concerning the kind of acts included in the word "content," the Louisiana jurisprudence
declared it was narrower than "any recital" and oral agreements were not generally included. See
Reginald E. Cassibry, Louisiana 's
ParolEvidence Rule: Civil Code Article 2276,35 LA. L. REV.
779, 781 (1975).
"' See Dixie Campers, Inc. v. Vesely Co., 398 So. 2d 1087 (La. 1981); White v. Rimmer &
Garrett, Inc., 340 So. 2d 283 (La. 1976); Billingsley v. Bach Energy Corp., 588 So. 2d 786, 790
(La. Ct. App. 1991).
92 Cassibry, supra note 90, at 780.
9'Occasionally the courts have asserted that in Louisiana the rule is "evidentiary in nature
and not substantive." First Nat'l Bank of Ruston v. Mercer, 448 So. 2d 1369, 1377 (La. Ct. App.
1984); Wade v. Joffrion, 387 So. 2d 1265, 1266 n.l (La. Ct. App. 1980); see also 5 SAOL
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writing was ineffective between the parties due to an alleged defect in the
consent,94 lack of consideration,9 5 or in case of simulation.96 Contemporaneous
oral agreements that are not made part of the written contract do not qualify as
an exception to the rule.97 Exceptions to the rule were recognized also where
proof of an additional term that the parties had not included in the writing was
admitted,98 or where there was a later oral modification of the agreement.99
Another exception is accepted for purposes of interpretation of the written
agreement. 0 0 Although parol evidence has been admitted in Louisiana to
clarify the true intent of the parties when the terms of the contract allow more
0
than one interpretation or when the terms used are ambiguous or uncertain,' 1
mere dispute about the meaning and scope of a contract clause does not make

LITVINOFF, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 12.94 (2d ed. 200 1).
This understanding, according to one source, was based on Writings and Oral Proofin Civilian
Jurisdictions:A Theoreticaland HistoricalPerspective, 35 LA. L. REv. 745 (1975). See Wade,
387 So. 2d at 1266-67 (Watkins, J., dissenting). At other times, the courts recognized the
exclusionary rule as a substantive one. See Parlay Enters., Inc. v. R-B-CO, Inc., 504 So. 2d 660
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Ortolano v. Snowizard Mfg., Inc., 476 So. 2d 359 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
" Louisiana courts have invoked lack of consent or vices in consent in Le Bleu v. Savoie,
33 So. 729 (La. 1903), and Sylvester v. Town of Ville Platte,49 So. 2d 746 (La. 1950); error in
B. Segall Co. v. JC. Trahan, 290 So. 2d 854 (La. 1974); and unfulfilled suspensive condition
in Wampler v. Wampler, 118 So. 2d 423 (La. 1960), among other cases. Cases of error in
personarn were admitted in Haney v. Dunn, 96 So. 2d 243 (La. Ct. App. 1957), Succession of
Prescott, 127 So. 611 (La. 1930), Robert v. Boulat, 9 La. Ann. 29 (La. 1854), and Palanguev.
Guesnon, 15 La. 311 (La. 1840); error in substantiam was discussed in HarnischfegerSale Corp.
v. SternbergCo., 154 So. 10 (La. 1934).
9' See Smith v. Smith, 119 So. 2d 827 (La. 1960); Logan v. Walker, 94 So. 430 (La. 1922);
George M. Snellings III, Note, Sales - Admission of ParolEvidence to Annul an Authentic Act,
21 LA. L. REv. 680, 681 (1961).
96 Rachal v. Rachal, 4 La. Ann. 500 (La. 1849).
9' Pope v. Khalaileh, 905 So. 2d 1149 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Bernard v. Iberiabank, 832 So.
2d 355 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Crochet v. Pierre, 646 So. 2d 1222 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
98 See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 69 So. 2d 367 (La. 1953) (discussing whether in case of
absence of a required amount of money the plaintiff has carte blanche or a cost limitation).
" Tholl Oil Co. v. Miller, 3 So. 2d 97 (La. 1941). This case was a proceeding for the
cancellation of recordation of an oil and gas sublease containing an option to repurchase. See
also Parlor City Lumber Co. v. Sandel, 173 So. 737 (La. 1937).
100In GulfRef Co. v. Garrett,25 So. 2d 329 (La. 1946), a case involving monies deposited
for royalties, the supreme court accepted extrinsic evidence as an aid to construction when the
contract is so ambiguous that it creates doubt as to what the parties intended.
101In Hogan v. Lobell, 608 So. 2d 240 (La. Ct. App. 1992), the court refused to see
ambiguities as to the location or extent of a servitude. But see Mathieu v. Nettles, 383 So. 2d
1337 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Choctaw Home Builders, Inc. v. Lena, Inc., 223 So. 2d 23 (La. Ct.
App. 1969); Hamill v. Moore, 193 So. 715 (La. 1939).
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the contract an ambiguous one.1" 2 It is noteworthy that the concept of good
faith between parties is central to the rules on obligations established in the
Louisiana Civil Code. 3 The Civil Code of Louisiana contains a reference to
contracts for a value not in excess of five hundred dollars.'" In the former
case, the contract must be proved by "competent evidence," i.e., evidence
regarded as relevant and admissible." 5 The reference to a limit in money is
somewhat akin to the civil law rule fixing a limit in money for proving a
contract by witnesses, which will be explained later in this Article." 6
However, the similarities end there as shown by the parol evidence rule of
Article 1848 of the Louisiana Civil Code and the rules related to the scope of
discovery in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.0 7 The question in
Louisiana will be then, how the document executed by the contrary party came
into the possession or knowledge of the party.'
The principle of
commencement of proof, as known by the civil law tradition, is not applicable
in Louisiana.'0 9
Finally, it should be mentioned that the parol evidence rule had also been
accepted in cases related to the so-called sale per aversionem."° This

102See Gulf States Fin. Corp. v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 181 So. 2d 36 (La. 1965). In this

case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that parol evidence was admissible: 1) to prove
fraud, mistake, illegality, want or failure of consideration; 2) to explain an ambiguity when such
explanation was not inconsistent with the written terms; and 3) to show that the writing was only
a part of an entire oral agreement between the parties. Id. at 38-39. See also Scafidi v. Johnson,
420 So. 2d 1113 (La. 1982); Myles v. Consol. Cos., 906 So. 2d 677 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
103 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1759, 1983 (1973). On the influence of the U.C.C. as well
as the incorporation of the CISG rules in Louisiana, see Alain Levasseur, La Convention de
Vienne sur la Vente de Marchandises et le Code Civil Louisianais, in ETUDES OFFERTES A
JACQUES DUPICHOT - LIBER AMICORUM 299 (2004).

"0 "When the agreement does not exceed five hundred dollars, it is not required to be reduced
to writing, but the statement of the claim must be recorded, in the manner required by law, to
preserve the privilege." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2776 (1973). In the case of contracts exceeding that
amount, see LA. CIv. CODE art. 2775 (1973).
105See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1846 (1973); see also LA. CODE EviD. arts. 401,402 (referring to
"relevant" and "admissible evidence").
106 See infra Part III.D; see also L1TvlNOFFsupranote 93, § 12.106.
107See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1422 (restricting the rules on privileged matters).
108 Id.
'o9See infra Part III.D.
10 This term is defined as the sale for a lump price of immovables described as a certain and

limited body. See Robinson v. Atkins, 30 So. 231 (La. 1901); Jackson v. Harris, 136 So. 166
(La. Ct. App. 1931). Under Article 2495 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, the courts have
consistently accepted the completion of the description of the property sold, designated by its
name only, or in general when the writing is insufficient to identify that property with accuracy.
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jurisprudence can be better evaluated by considering the system for recordation
in use in most of Louisiana."' After the hurricanes that affected the coastal
states in 2005, eroding considerable parts of land and flooding several
registries for immovable transactions, proving titles, deeds, and boundaries
will be in some cases extremely difficult. 1 It should be recalled that only
eight of sixty-four parishes in Louisiana had digitalized their title records
before the hurricanes.1 3 Any court confronted with conflicting interests on a
tract of land whose boundaries have disappeared and its records washed away
by the flood will require a more flexible approach to the parol evidence rule
for resolving the multiple problems arising from the loss of the registered
documents.
2. Scotland
In Scotland, where the Roman law applied at the time Scotland and England
were different kingdoms, the development of the rule has followed a different

This practice is referred to as "eking out title." M. Thomas Arceneaux, Writing Requirements
and the AuthenticAct inLouisianaLaw:Civil Code Articles 2236, 2275 & 2278,35 LA. L. REV.
764, 770 (1975). See Tircuit v. Burton-Swartz Cypress Co., 110 So. 489 (La. 1926); Saunders
v. Bolden, 98 So. 867 (La. 1923).
. All deeds related to the transfer of title or any rights on immovables must be filed for
registry to be effective against third parties. Consequently, attorneys and title researchers in
Louisiana must look in the respective binder, bundle, or package where the deed was placed in
order to determine its respective chain of title. The reference is to those documents affecting the
property which should be recorded and properly indexed in the respective record (conveyance
and mortgages) maintained by the clerk of the court in the parish where the immovable is
located. See the position against the so called "title insurance companies" pointed out by
KONRADZWEIGERT& HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 39 (Tony Weir trans.,
3d ed. 1998).
ml2The real estate title examiner usually looks for a survey drawn by an engineer or a
professional land surveyor which will control in case of discrepancy between the title description
and the survey. See, e.g., Michel v. James, 144 So. 2d 435 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Casso v.
Ascension Realty Co., 196 So. 1 (La. 1940); Lotz v. Hurwitz, 141 So. 83 (La. 1932). The
original surveys usually have been done taking geographic or relevant marks as points of
reference. In 1927, the Louisiana Coordinate System was established for defining the geographic
position of points within the state. LA. REV. STAT. § 50:1 (2006). See Fred A. Bernstein, The
New Orleans Market Is Poisedto Recover, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, at A16. All surveys or
re-surveys approved by the Register of the State Land Office are binding on the parties and serve
as "conclusive evidence of the correctness thereof in any court." LA. REV. STAT. § 50:128
(2006).
..
3 See Deon Roberts, DigitizedDeeds ProtectedJeff ParishMarket, NEW ORLEANS CITY
Bus., Nov. 14,2005, availableat http://www.jpclerkofcourt.us/Miscellaneous/CityBusiness.pdf.
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path."' 4 As it happens in common law jurisdictions, the parol evidence rule in
Scotland declared extrinsic evidence inadmissible when the parties condensed
their understanding in a written instrument, which was presumed to be the best
and complete expression of their will."' When the deed conclusively probes
its genuineness as a complete and self-delimited expression of the will of its
executors, it has been regarded asprobatioprobataof the parties' intentions. 6
When a formal deed has been executed, the expressed will of the parties
supersedes any other document or testimony having arisen from prior
negotiations between them.' However, the application of the rule has not
been so strict and rigorous, with the courts admitting further evidence when
necessary for the sake of doing justice to the parties,"' letting the rule's scope
be reduced by numerous exceptions." 9 Thus, one court has held the parol
evidence rule does not apply when the written agreement was just the exercise
of the desire to preserve in writing what was agreed to verbally. 2 Extrinsic
evidence also has been seen as competent to explain ambiguous circumstances
related in a writing,"' in case of patent or latent ambiguity of the contractual
23
terms, 22 or in case of mistake in the description of the object of the contract. 1

114

See William M. Gordon, Roman Law in Scotland, in THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION IN

SCOTLAND 13-40 (Robin Evans-Jones ed., 1995); LORD STAIR, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW

OF SCOTLAND (David M. Walker ed., University Press 1981) (1681).
11 STEPHEN WOOLMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCOTS LAWOF CONTRACT 93-94 (1987).
116A proven proof. See M'Intyre v. National Bank of Scotland, 1910 S.C. 150; 6
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 418-19 (1928). See also the very illustrative case
concerning a lessor of a cafd in Glasgow invoking the parol evidence rule to prove an additional
oral agreement between the parties in Perdikou v. Pattison, 1958 S.L.T. 153.
Il

DAVID M. WALKER, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND

345 (3d ed. 1995); see also Guthrie v. Glasgow & S.W. Ry., (1858) 20 D. 825; Clark v. Clark's
Trs., (1860) 23 D. 74. In case of a subsequent written agreement, the rule of parol evidence has
been seen as ineffective. See Stewart v. Clark, (1871) 8 S.L.R. 402; Largue v. Urquhart, (1881)
18 S.L.R. 491.
118WOOLMAN, supra note 115, at 94.
119j.j. Gow, THE MERCANTILE AND INDUSTRIAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 13-14 (1964). Consent
to the nonperformance of the other party may be proved by parol evidence. See Kirkpatrick v.
Allanshaw Coal Co., 1888 R. 327, cited in STAIR, supra note 114, at 347 n.6.
120Ireland & Son v. Rosewell Gas Coal Co., (1900) 7 S.L.T. 445.
121 Hunter v. Miller, (1862) 24 D. 1011; Fleming & Co. v. Airdrie Iron Co., (1882) 9 R. 473;
Sutton & Co. v. Ciceri & Co., (1890) 17 R. 40.
122See W.M. GLOAG & R. CANDLISH HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND
139, para. 12.16 (A.B. Wilkinson et al. eds., 9th ed. 1987). Marshall explains that an ambiguity
is "latent" where doubt about the precise meaning used in the contract arises from knowledge
derived from its surrounding circumstances. ENIDA. MARSHALL, GENERALPRINCIPLES OF SCOTS
LAW 263 (1971). Extrinsic evidence has been accepted for determining the true meaning of
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Gow mentions the admission of extrinsic evidence to explain, for example,
what property was "the property known as the Royal Hotel.' ' 124 The parol
evidence rule has not been followed when, in spite of an unambiguous deed,
the writing was recognized by the parties to be incorrect.125 Extrinsic evidence
has been sometimes avowed in cases of collateral agreements pretending to be
part of the final agreement. 26 A situation in which the parties have executed
a written agreement does not exclude the introduction of proof of an existing
trade usage between
them, unless the contract expressly declared the usage
127
inapplicable.

The work of the Scottish Law Commission, 128 an independent body
established in 1965 with the purpose of modernizing Scottish law, has
produced some interesting results. In a Report on Three BadRules in Contract
Law, 129 the Commission recommended the abolition of the parol evidence rule

contractual terms or words. WALKER, supra note 117, at 356; see also GLOAG & HENDERSON,
supra,para. 12.14 (citing Renison v. Bryce, (1897) 5 S.L.T. 222; De Lasalle v. Guildford, (190 1)
2 K.B. 215). In one case, the admission by the defendant that the contract did not express the
agreement between the parties allowed the court to admit extrinsic evidence. See Grant's Trs.
v. Morison, (1875) 2 R. 377; Cairns v. Davidson, 1913 S.C. 1054.
123 See Anderson v. Lambie, 1954 S.C. (H.L.) 43; see also Krupp v. Menzies, 1907 S.C. 903
(admitting oral evidence for contradicting a mistake expressed in the written deed).
24 Gow, supra note 119, at 14 (quoting Macdonald v. Newall, (1898) 1 F. 68). Macdonald
is a clear case ofsaleper aversionem as considered by Article 2495 the Civil Code of Louisiana:
an immovable described as a certain limited body or as a distinct object sold for a lump price.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2495 (2006).
125 Grant's Trs., (1875) 2 R. 377. Grant's Trustees was mentioned by Lord Guthrie in
Pickardv. Pickard,1963 S.C. 604,611 and by Lord Russell in M'Menemy v. Forster'sTrustee,
1938 S.L.T. 555. See also Grant v. Mackenzie, (1899) 1 F. 889 (holding that when one of the
parties gave evidence that destroyed the trust, parol evidence was competent to show the true
agreement).
'126Dodds v. Walker, (1882) 2 S. 81 (N.E. 73); Semple v. Kyle, (1902) 4 F. 421. This
occurred, for example, in a case where one party was allowed to prove by parol evidence that the
written contract had been executed subject to a suspensive condition as to ratification. Abraham
& Sons v. Robert Miller Ltd., 1933 S.C. 171. It should be recalled that proof of a fact contained
in a written agreement or in a conveyance on the sale of any property required to be stamped
could not be given as evidence according to the Stamp Act of 1891 still in force, unless duly
stamped. Stamp Act, 1891, 54 & 55 Vict., c. 39. However, Gow, supranote 119, at 15, affirms
that there is authority allowing the use of a non-stamped document for proving a collateral
purpose, such as to show the state of accounts between the parties.
127Duthie & Co. v. Merson & Gerry, 1947 S.C. 43; Eunson v. Johnson & Grieg, 1940 S.C.
49; Tancred, Arrol & Co. v. Steel Co. of Scotland Ltd., (1890) 17 R. 31 (H.L.), (1887) 15 R.
215.
128 See Scottish Law Commission, http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk (last visited Apr. 5,2007).
129 See SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, SCOT LAW COM No. 152, REPORT ON THREE BAD RuLES
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based on the several exceptions to the rule which negated all presumed
advantages of it: "It is difficult to see any justification for a rule which
prevents a party from proving a valid and subsisting term of a contract and
which is plainly liable to produce injustice and resentment."' 3 ° The draft of the
bill proposed by the Commission replaced the parol evidence rule with a
rebuttable presumption. The Contract (Scotland) Act 1997 established that
"[w]here a document appears . . . to comprise all the express terms of a
contract .
it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the
document does . . . comprise all the express terms of the contract .... 13
Extrinsic evidence shall be admissible to prove that the contract includes any
additional agreed term whether written or not.' 32
Scottish scholars reacted favorably to the approval of CISG within the
United Kingdom. 33 The Scottish Law Commission rendered a report
recommending the enactment of legislation modifying some aspects of Scottish
law following CISG. 134 However, as of the date of publication it has not been
enacted.
3. South Africa
Roman-Dutch influence was present in the colony established by the Dutch
at the "Western Cape" colony in Africa and remained in force even after
England seized the colony in 1806, being however overlaid by the heavy

IN CONTRACT LAW (1996), availableat http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/rep 152.pdf.
130Id. para. 2.14.
' See Contract (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 34, para. 1(1), availableathttp://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts 1997/1997034.htm.
.32Id. para. 1(2). Paragraph 1(2) of the Act, in the pertinent part, states that "[e]xtrinsic oral
or documentary evidence shall be admissible to prove . . . that the contract . . . includes
additional express terms (whether or not written terms)." Id.
.33
Forte, supra note 43, at 66.
134

See SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, SCOT LAW COM No. 144, REPORT ON FORMATION OF

CONTRACT: SCOTTISH LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE

INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS para. 2.6 (1993), availableat http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/
downloads/rep I 44.pdf. In this report, the Scottish Law Commission deals briefly with the parol
evidence rule in paragraph 2.6. Notwithstanding that the Commission expresses its intention to
reconsider in the future the rules of interpretation, it opines that the mere adoption of Article 8
of the CISG will bring the attention of the parties to the question of whether a contract had been
concluded, which would be a good thing in itself for avoiding contradictory views between
different instances as in Mathieson Gee (Ayrshire)Ltd. v. Quigley, 1952 S.C. (H.L.) 38.
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English influence after its incorporation
into the British Empire until the
35
creation of the Union of South Africa.1
In South Africa, the parol evidence rule has been predominantly regarded
as part of the law of evidence, and consequently, decisions of the English
courts have had special relevance as part of the law of evidence. 136 As long as
the evidence in discussion relates to objective background facts, the admission
of which does not offend the parol evidence rule, it will be seen as admissible.
If a contract is required by law to be rendered in writing, the agreement must
contain a proper description of the thing sold and parol evidence will not be
accepted.137 A commission charged with suggesting changes rendered a report
summarizing the divergent views in South African doctrine about abolishing
3
or retaining the parol evidence rule. 1
4. Qutbec
Qu6bec is an isolated civil law system within a common law nation. As it
will be shown in the following Part, countries belonging to the Roman Civil
law tradition are more inclined to recognize that contracts should be honored
because of the pacta sunt servandaprinciple,' 39 and additionally, when such
contracts are written, some principles should be followed for their
interpretation. Accordingly, the Civil Code of Quebec establishes that the
parties to a juridical act set forth in writing may not contradict or vary the

...ZWEIGERT

& KOTZ, supra note 111, at 232; see Daniel Visser, The Structure of Law in

South Africa, in

LA STRUCTURE DES SYSTEMES JURIDIQUES, XVIE CONGRtS DE L'ACADEMIE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 89-114 (Olivier Morkeau & Jacques Varlinden eds.,

2002).
136 See Cassiem v StandardBank ofS. Afr. Ltd. 1930 A.D.
366 (A) (S. Aft.); ALASTAiRKERR,
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 264 (1989).
...
See Haedermans(Vriburg) (Pty) vPingBai1997 (3) SA 1004, at 1008-09 (S. Afr.); Kriel
& Another v Le Roux 2000 (2) All SA 65 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Slabbert v Ldtter 2004 (opinion of
Leach, J.) (unreported case ofthe High Court of South Africa), availableathttp://www.ru.ac.za/
academic/faculties/law/ecd/Judgments/Slabbert.doc.
138 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, DISCUSSION PAPER 65, PROJECT 47,
UNREASONABLE
STIPULATIONS IN CONTRACTS AND THE RECTIFICATION OF CONTRACTS (1998). The suggestion
of the Commission to incorporate reform of the South African legislation in the future is evident
in the following paragraph: "Whether or not the words of the contract appear to be ambiguous
evidence of what passed during negotiations between the parties during and after the execution
of the contract and surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of any
contract." Id. at 206.
"9 Latin expression signifying that any agreement, contract, or treaty should be honored.
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0
terms of the writing by testimony unless there is commencement ofproof'4
In Canadian jurisprudence, this expression connotes a writing emanating from
the party against whom it is to be used, which tends to render probable the
existence of the fact which is desired to be proven. 4 ' In interpreting a
contract, the Civil Code of Qu6bec recommends recognizing the common
intention of the parties and their usages, rather than the literal meaning of the
words used in a document.142 The Consumer Protection Act 143 modified some
aspects of the law of contracts, requiring that in specific cases the contract
must be evidenced in writing.'" As it will be shown in the next Part, the
pattern followed by Qudbec belongs clearly to the civil law tradition.

5. Summary of Mixed Jurisdictions
There is no other location where the parol evidence rule might be seen in
all its possible varieties as in the mixed jurisdictions. The range goes from the
clear common law attitude adopted in South Africa, passing through the
contradictions shown in Louisiana, the transformations of Scotland, up to the
clear civil law attitude assumed in Qu6bec. Nothing could better summarize
the discrepancies, ambivalence, and fluctuations triggered by the rule.
D. The Civil Law Tradition
Most of the nations belonging to the civil law tradition accept the probative
force of a writing on the assumption that when there is no indication of the
existence of a vice of consent of any kind in the contract, the presumption
prevails that the instrument is an accurate mirror of the entire agreement of the
parties. This principle is the result of a group of provisions contained either
in the civil or commercial codes and in the codes of civil proceedings. The
written text is presumed to be the final agreement reached by the parties, and

'40 CompareCivil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q., ch. 64, art. 2863 (1991), with Chong Lee Dojang,
Inc. v. Garadex, Inc., [1986] R.D.J. 526 (C.A.). The new version of the Civil Code of Qudbec
came into effect in January 1994 replacing the Civil Code for Lower Canada of 1865.
141

See Johnston v. Buckland, [ 1937] S.C.R. 86, summarizedin LES PRINCIPAUX ARRETS

DU

DROIT DE LA PREUVE CIvILE - RECUEIL COLLECTtF 255
142
141

(Themis 1994).
Civil Code ofQudbec, S.Q., ch. 64, §§ 1425-1426 (1991).
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., ch. P-40. 1 availableat http://www.iijcan.org/qc/laws/

sta/p-40.1/2006031 0/whole.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
'44 See, e.g., id. §§ 58,150.4,158,190, 199; see Grald Goldstein& Najla Mestiri, LaLibertg
Contractuelleet ses Limites, in MELANGES JEAN PINEAu 323 (Benoit Moore ed., 2003).
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it should be honored according to the principle ofpactasunt servanda,and the
basic rule of good faith.'4 5 The main difference between the use of the rule at
common law and in the civil Roman tradition is that in the former system,
parol evidence is a rule of substantive law-a prohibition to go outside of the
written document which consolidates the will of the parties-but in the latter,
if something similar to the rule could be recognized, it should be seen as a rule
of evidence.' 46
In most of the codes of civil proceedings belonging to the civil law
tradition, there is a mention that proof by witnesses is admissible only up to a
certain point, unless there is commencement of proof by writing.
Commencement of proof, already mentioned in the brief summary of Quebec,
means any written document originating with an adverse party that provides
evidence of the alleged fact or the litigious right. Accordingly, under the
French Civil Code, whenever the object of an agreement exceeds a certain sum
of money, a contract should be made in writing and no proof by witnesses will
be allowed against it.14 This clause is suggested not to be of public order, and

"' See supra note 139; see also C. Civ. art. 1134 (Fr.) (providing "[les conventions
1dgalement form6es tiennent lieu de loi Aceux qui les ont faites.... Elles doivent 8tre ex6cutdes
de bonne foi."). The English translation is available at Legifrance, Civil Code, http://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codestraduits/codeciviltextA.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2007)
("Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who have made them.
They may be revoked only by mutual consent, or for causes authorized by law. They must be
performed in good faith."). Similar text appears in COD. Civ. arts. 1197-98 (Arg.); C.C. art.
1258 (Spain), and C.c. arts. 1366, 1372, 1375 (Italy), among others.
146 In Roman law, any writing between private persons was sufficient proof of the facts
transcribed when the writing was done with the necessary clarity and accuracy, and provided that
there were no doubts upon the authenticity and veracity of the writing. If it was attacked, the
remaining proof was testimonial. 1 CHARLES MAYNZ, COURS DE DROIT ROMAIN 456, § 154 (3d
ed. 1870).
141 See C. CiV. art. 1341 (Fr.):
I1 doit etre pass6 acte devant notaires ou sous signatures privies de toutes
choses exc6dant une somme ou une valeur fixde par d6cret, meme pour ddp6ts
volontaires, et il n'est requ aucune preuve par t6moins contre et outre le
contenu aux actes, ni sur ce qui serait all6gu6 avoir dt6 dit avant, lors ou
depuis les actes, encore qu'il s'agisse d'une somme ou valeur moindre.
See English version, Legifrance, Civil Code, availableat http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/
codestraduits/codeciviltextA.htm (last visited Apr. 6,2007) ("An instrument before notaires
or under private signature must be executed in all matters exceeding a sum or value fixed by
decree, even for voluntary deposits, and no proof by witness is allowed against or beyond the
contents of instruments, or as to what is alleged to have been said before, at the time of, or after
the instruments, although it is a question of a lesser sum or value.").
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accordingly, the parties may decide otherwise.14 Something similar happens
in Spain. According to the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Spanish
Commercial Code, proof by witnesses alone is not enough to show the
existence of a contract worth more than a certain amount of money. Contracts
made with specific formalities are exempted. 49 Only the Italian Civil Code,
in force since 1942, contains a text similar to the common law understanding
of the parol evidence rule, refusing the proof by witnesses of prior or
contemporary agreements of a written document. 5 In Italy, other means of
evidence are accepted ifthe legitimacy of the writing involved is questioned.' 5 '
Thus, a judge may allow means of proof by witnesses of agreements or
documents made after the writing.'
The German Civil Code amalgamates ideas of good faith (Treu und
Glauben) and recognized customs for the interpretation of contracts.' 53 The
will of the parties should be recognized, keeping in mind the true sense of the
contract and not just its literal meaning. 5 4 Complete written agreements are

148 See PHILIPPE MALINVAUD, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS

250 (8th ed. 2003).

149 C. COM. art. 52.1 (Spain). The Civil Code of Puerto Rico cites article 1281 of the Spanish

Civil Code as a source for its own section 3471 ("If the words should appear contrary to the
evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail."). P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
31, § 3471 (2004).
150See C.c. art. 2722 (Italy) ("La prova per testimoni non 6 ammessa se ha per oggetto patti
aggiunti o contrari al contenuto di un documento, per i quali si alleghi che la stipulazione 6 stata
anteriore o contemporanea.") ("Proof by witnesses is not permitted to establish stipulations
which have been added or are contrary to the contents of a document, and which are claimed to
have been made prior to or at the same time as the document."). The English translation is
provided by MARIA BELTRAMO, GIOVANNI E. LONGO & JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE ITALIAN
CIVIL CODE 693 (1969). See also Cass., 25 maggio 1992, n.6246. In relation to the rules of
interpretation of contracts, see C.C. art. 1362 (Italy).
...C.c. art. 2724 (Italy).
152Id. art. 2723.
113See Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1996, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI], §§ 133, 157, 242 (F.R.G.). Concerning the multiplicity of cases and scholarly
contributions on BGB § 242, see Peter Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in
International Uniform Laws, in CENTRO DI STUDI E RICERCHE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E
STRANIERO, SAGGI, CONFERENZE E SEMINARI No. 24 (Michael J. Bonell ed., 1997), availableat

http://soi.cnr.it/-crdcs/crdcs/schlechtriem.htm.
114 BGB § 133 (F.R.G.) ("Bei der Auslegung einer Willenserklarung ist der wirkliche Wille
zu erforschen und nicht an dem buchstAblichen Sinne des Ausdrucks zu haften.") (In the
interpretation of a declaration of intention the true intention is to be sought without regard to the
literal meaning of the expression.). Translation provided by ARTHURTAYLOR VONMEHREN, THE
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 880 (1957).
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presumed to be correct under the principle of good
faith. However, additional
55
evidence, even unwritten, may be admissible.1
Concerning the rule of evidence, it should be recalled that an attenuated
distinction between merchants and non-merchants continues to be recognized
in the civil law tradition. In France, the differences are reflected in the
existence of a Code civil and a Code de commerce. Merchants must record
their transactions in mercantile books, the keeping of which is mandatory.'5 6
Accordingly, a question arises whether these books can be brought as evidence
against a written instrument. Originally, the French doctrine accepted those
books as proof even against a non-merchant party if they were carried in due
form.' 57 The former Article 109 of the French Code de commerce, for
example, listed the recognized means to confirm the existence of a sale.
Today, the new drafting allows any kind of recognized legal means to confirm
a sale between merchants.' 58 Thus, mercantile books can be used as proof
against merchants, but not against non-merchants to whom the rules of the
159
Civil Code apply.
Other countries maintain the difference. In the chapter concerning contract
interpretation, the Spanish Civil Code establishes the rule of recognizing the
intention of the parties in the case of civil (non-commercial) contracts. To
ascertain that intention, attention must be given to acts of the parties that are
155See KARL LARENZ, ALLGEMEINERTEILDES DEUTSCHEN BURGERLICHENRECHTS

306,315

(5th ed. 1980).
156 See C. COM. art. L 123-12 (Fr.). The English version can be found at Legifrance,
Commercial Code, http://www.legifi-ance.gouv.fr/htmlcodestraduits/commercetextA.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2007).
"1 7 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN AIS 936
(2d ed. 1954). Article 1341 of the French Civil Code expressed that the main rule concerning
written documents is without prejudice of the situation of merchants regulated by commercial
legislation: "Le tout sans prdjudice de ce qui est prescrit dans les lois relatives au commerce."
("All of which without prejudice to what is prescribed in the statutes relating to commerce.")
Translation provided by Legifrance, availableat http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk
&c=22&r=484 (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
158C. COM. art. L 110-3 (Fr.) ("A l'6gard des commergants, les actes de commerce peuvent
se prouver par tous moyens Amoins qu'il n'en soit autrement dispos6 par la loi.") ("With regard
to traders, commercial instruments may be proven by any means unless the law specifies
otherwise."). Translation provided by Legifrance, available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.
phtml?iang=uk&c=32&r=2940 (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
This difference between commercial and non-commercial contractual obligations is now
vanishing. Formerly, Article 44 of the Italian Codice di commercio enumerated the means to
prove the existence or nonexistence of a commercial obligation. After 1942, as it also later
happened in Switzerland and in the Netherlands, both commercial and civil obligations have
been reunited in the civil code.
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contemporary with, or which occur after the writing. 6 Contracts between
merchants, on the other hand, are regulated in a specific chapter of the Spanish
Commercial Code.'61 In Switzerland, the legislation seems to go beyond the
differences between merchants and non-merchants. According to the Swiss
Civil Code, the Swiss Code of Obligations applies in all matters related to
formation, performance, and termination of contracts. 61 2 If a contract must be
in writing, every alteration thereof must also be made in writing, except
supplementary nonessential provisions that do not contradict the instrument.163
The intention of the parties must be considered when interpreting the form and
the content of a contract,"6 looking into the parties' behavior at the time of the
contract and thereafter.' 6 5
160

See C.C. art. 1282 (Spain) ("Para juzgar de la intenci6n de los contratantes, deberd

atenderse principalmente a los actos de 6stos, coetAneos y posteriores al contrato.") ("In order
to judge the intention of the parties to a contract, attention should be paid principally to their
acts, contemporaneous with and subsequent to the contract.").
161 See C. COM., Book I, Tit. IV.
162 See Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 7
(Switz.). "Les dispositions gdn6rales du droit des obligations relatives Ala conclusion, aux effets
et A l'extinction des contrats sont aussi applicables aux autres mati~res du droit civil." ("The
general rules laid down in the law of obligations regarding the formation, the effect and the
determination of contracts apply also to the other parts of Private Law.") Translation by
SIEGFRIED WYLER & BARBARA WYLER, THE SWISS CIVIL CODE: COMPLETELY RESET, REVISED
AND UP-DATED EDITION WITH NOTES, VOCABULARIES, INDEX AND A SYNOPSIS OF ALL CHANGES
OF THE LAW SINCE 1912, at 2 (1987).
163 Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911, SR 220,
art. 12 (Switz.). "Lorsque la loi exige qu'un contrat soit fait en la forme dcrite, cette r~gle
s'applique 6galement A toutes les modifications du contrat, hormis les stipulations
compl6mentaires et accessoires qui ne sont pas en contradiction avec l'acte." ("Where the law
requires a contract to be in writing, such requirement is also applicable to any modification
thereof, except for ancillary points of a complementary nature which are not contradictory to

such contract.") English translation by the SWIss-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SWISS
CONTRACT LAW 18 (1984). The French text is also available at Les autoritds Fdrales de la

Conf6d6ration Suisse, http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a12.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
'64 OR art. 18,
1. "Pour apprdcier la forme et les clauses d'un contrat, il y a lieu de
rechercher la r6elle et commune intention des parties, sans s'arr~ter aux expressions ou
denominations inexactes dont elles ont pu se servir, soit par erreur, soit pour d6guiser la nature
vritable de la convention." ("As regards both the form and content of a contract, the real intent
which is mutually agreed upon shall be considered, and not an incorrect statement or method of
expression used by the parties, whether due to error, or with the intention of concealing the true
nature of the contract.") English translation by the SWISS-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
SWISS CONTRACT LAW 20 (1984) (references omitted). The French text is also available at Les

autorit~s Fd6rales de la Conf~d6ration Suisse, http:// admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a78.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2007).
165 See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] 96 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen
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Some contracts in civil law jurisdictions are required by law to be written,
and this precondition affects the validity of the legal transaction."' Hence, as
it happens with the deeds conveying ownership on immovable property, a
public document is required, usually a contract prepared and signed before a
notary.'67 But informality or lack of valid form is the usual rule between the
parties for everyday transactions. In relation to the interpretation of contracts,
the Roman law system recognizes that if the terms of a contract are clear and
unequivocal on the intention of the parties, they prevail over any other
interpretation.'6 8 If some provisions are in conflict, or ambiguous, they should
be interpreted in the manner most consistent with the parties' intent, taking
into account usages and customs.' 69 Several codes adopt the contra
proferentem rule, which, in case of doubt about the meaning of a clause, places
the burden of proof on the drafting party. 7 0
The first Part of this Article has presented how the rule operates at common
law, how it is considered in jurisdictions of mixed character, as well as how it
has proven relatively uniform among the nations belonging to the Roman civil
law tradition. The second Part will analyze how the parol evidence rule is
evaluated in three main areas of current international commercial law: the
CISG, the UNIDROIT principles, and the European Principles on Contract.
These three different instruments, however diverse in their nature and scope,
all share the common objective of unifying rules of international contracts.
IV. LEX MERCATORIA

Lex Mercatoriais a Latin expression identifying a dynamic group of rules
established by merchants for regulating international trade. The use of this
expression initially was regarded as vague and diffuse. " Today, the concept

Bundesgerichts [BGE] II 333 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court]
Entscheidungen des Schweizerichen Bundesgerichts [BGE] II 418, E.6.
166 See COD. CIv. art. 1184 (Arg.); C.C. art. 1280 (Spain), C.C. art. 1350 (Italy).
167 C. civ. art. 1317 (Fr.).
168

107

C. civ. art. 1156 (Fr.); C6digo Civil Distrito Federal [C.C.D.F.] [Civil Code for the

Federal District] art. 1851 (Mex.); C.C. art. 1362 (Italy); C.C. art. 1281 (Spain).
169 See C. civ. art. 1159 (Fr.); COD. Civ. art. 1198 (Arg.); C.c. art. 1368 (Italy), C.C. art. 1287

(Spain).
170
171

C. civ. art. 1162 (Fr.), C.C. art. 1288 (Spain), C.C. art. 1370 (Italy).
Like a ghost ship, this term sails through the discussion of international trade. "Wie ein

Geisterschiff treibt dieser Begriff durch die internationale handelsrechtliche Diskussion,"
according to the colorful language of Rolf Herber, " 'Lex Mercatoria' und 'PrinciplesGefdhrliche Irrlichterim internationalenKaufrecht," 3 INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT I,
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summarizes international commercial usages and customs as well as several
treaties, conventions, and rules accepted by the international merchant
community, which in fact are the major force moving the legal dynamic of
international commerce.1 72 In this Part, three different, but sometimes
overlapping, groups of rules will be compared: the CISG, the principles of
UNIDROIT, and the principles of European Contract Law. It is, however,
beyond the purpose of this Article to inquire about the reasons behind this
proliferation of different instruments with the common objective of
harmonizing international commercial law.' 73 Some principles can be
reconciled among themselves, but others seem to be in conflict with the
original pursued objective of international unification, such as creating 7a4
separate group of rules where some unification has already been attained.
Among the group of norms included and first to be considered, the 1980 U.N.
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
in its seventy
has a relevant position in modem lex mercatoria,representing
75
member states more than 80% of world commerce. 1

5 (2003). However, see the explicative and descriptive title of the sixth edition of two volumes
prepared at the beginning of the nineteenth century by WYNDHAM BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA,
OR, A COMPLETE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW BEING A GENERAL GUIDE TO ALL MEN IN
BUSINESS; WHETHER AS TRADERS, REMITTERS, OWNERS, FREIGHTERS, CAPTAINS, INSURERS,
BROKERS, FACTORS, SUPERCARGOES, OR AGENTS WITH AN ACCOUNT OF OUR MERCANTILE
COMPANIES OF OUR COLONIES AND FACTORIES ABROAD OF OUR COMMERCIAL TREATIES WITH

FOREIGN POWERS, OF THE DUTY OF CONSULS, AND OF THE LAWS CONCERNING ALIENS,
NATURALIZATION, AND DENIZATION: To WHICH IS ADDED AS ACCOUNT OF THE COMMERCE OF

THE WHOLE WORLD (1813).

172 See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretationof the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J.
INT'L& COMP. L. 183, 186 (1994).
173The CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles could be seen as complementary instruments,

but taking as a point of reference the 2004 version of the Principles, no fewer than two-thirds of
their articles have equivalent provisions in the European principles. See MICHAEL JOACHIM
BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW 339 (3d ed. 2005); Herbert
Kronke, The U.N. Sales Convention, the UNIDROIT ContractPrinciplesand the Way Beyond,
25 J.L. & COM. 451, 458 (2005).
17' But see Ewan McKendrick, HarmonisationofEuropean ContractLaw: The State We Are
In, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS, AND LEGAL PRACTICE 28-29 (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen
Weatherill eds., 2006).
171 UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/sale goods/l980CISG_
status.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
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A. The 1980 U.N. Vienna Convention (CISG)
In a treaty such as the CISG, with the primary goal of obtaining uniformity
in harmonizing different global understandings of the most important
international contracts, it was very unlikely to include a rule that has lost
supporters even in its own legal family. Article 11 of the CISG states, "[a]
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not
subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means,
including witnesses."' 76 The original official comment of this article,'77
prepared by the drafting Conference, explained this inclusion by the fact that
many contracts for the international sale of goods were concluded through
modern means of communication, not always involving a writing. A proposal
presented by Canada, introducing a limitation on admissible evidence in cases
where contracting parties had freely chosen to have a written contract, did not
obtain the necessary support from other participants at the drafting
Conference.' 78 The final approved text of the article states that "[a] contract
of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to
any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including
witnesses."' 79 Generally, it is accepted that the first part of the adopted text of
the article alludes to the doctrine of consensualism,"80 according to which no
specific formal requirement would be necessary regarding the formation of
contracts. But the second sentence of the article explains procedural
consequences related to the evidence accepted to prove a contract regulated by
the CISG in the civil law tradition.
It should be emphasized that Article 11 will not be applicable if the related
country, when ratifying the CISG, has made a declaration conforming to
Article 96 of the CISG.' 8 ' The CISG's lack of the requirement of form leaves

176

CISG, supra note 6, art. 11.

1' UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS

20(1981). The article was numbered "10" during the drafting discussion and its text was almost
identical to the one approved.
178Id. at 270.
171 CISG, supra note 6, art. 11.
180 See Jerzi Rajski, Article 11, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE
1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 122 (Michael J. Bonell & C.M. Bianca eds., 1987), available
at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rajski-bbl I .html.
...Article 96 of the CISG reads:
A Contracting State whose legislation requires contracts of sale to be
concluded in or evidenced by writing may at any time make a declaration in
accordance with article 12 that any provision of article 11, article 29, or Part
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behind the already-mentioned and well-recognized common law statute of
frauds. 8 2 Consequently, when the CISG is applicable, oral contracts are
admissible,'8 3 but this rule will not apply to a contracting party having his
place of business in a state that has made an Article 96 declaration.' 84 The
drafters of Article 13 extended the meaning of "writing" to include the
telegram and the telex, which were common at the time of the signing of the
Convention. Naturally, other methods of electronic communication popular
today were unknown at the time of the drafting. When the Convention entered
into force in January 1988, the fax machine was already known and accepted
as the equivalent of a writing. 185 After all, faxes are printed on thermal paper

II of this Convention, that allows a contract of sale or its modification or
termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance, or other indication of
intention to be made in any form other than in writing, does not apply where
any party has his place of business in that State.
CISG, supranote 6, art. 96.
182See discussion supra Part III.B; see also U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995); Statute of Frauds, 29 Car.
2, c. 3, § 4 (Eng.); Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 14 (Eng.); Mercantile
Law Amendment Act, 1856, 22 Vic., c. 14 (U.K.); Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 57 Vic., c. 71, §
4(B) (U.K.). American courts were especially reluctant to reject the application of the rule. One
of the first American decisions involving the CISG analyzed this reluctance in a footnote.
Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The
court arrived at the same conclusion in a well-reasoned decision in the unreported case of
Claudiav. OlivieriFootwearLtd, No. 96 Civ. 8052, 1998 WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
In Be'ingMetals & MineralsImport/ExportCorporationv. American Business Center,Inc., 993
F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1993), another court asserted that the parol evidence rule as
recognized in Texas was applied to the parties, notwithstanding that the relationship between the
parties was regulated by the CISG. Also, the court stated in a footnote that "[w]e need not
resolve this choice of law issue, because our discussion is limited to application of the parol
evidence rule (which applies regardless),...." Id. at 1182 n.9 (emphasis added).
"83See Louis F. Del Duca, Implementation ofContractFormationStatute of Frauds,Parol
Evidence, and Battle of Forms CISG Provisions in Civil and Common Law Countries, 35 UCC
L.J. 56 (2005). The principle of freedom of forms does not impede the parties from deciding
otherwise. Article 29(2) of the CISG explains:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification
or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified
or terminated by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his
conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party has
relied on that conduct.
CISG, supranote 6, art. 29(2). The only limitation appears in the restriction explained in Article
96, when the law of a contracting state requires written contracts of sale.
,' See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185 ALEJANDRO M. GARRO & ALBERTO L. Zuppi, COMPRAVENTA INTERNACIONAL DE
MERCADERiAS 69 (1990); ROLF HERBER& BEATE CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT
71 (1991); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, INTERNATIONALES UN-KAUFRECHT 55, § 68 (2d ed. 2003).
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that decolorizes with the passing of time, yet still a printed paper and easy to
assimilate to a telegram or telex. But the newly developed electronic
transactions do not involve a "writing" in the classical sense. Only after
domestic legislation began to implement electronic contracting"' have scholars
shown a more flexible attitude toward extending the meaning of a "writing" to
electronic documents in accordance with CISG Article 13.187
Returning to the main subject of the comparison rule, it should be pointed
out that several U.S. courts have refused to apply the parol evidence rule
within the framework of the CISG. 88 For example, in the case presented in the
introduction, MCC - Marble Ceramic Center, where the CISG applied, the
court of appeals reversing the original decision refused to consider the
restriction included in the parol evidence rule.1 9 Despite the buyer's apparent
consent to the conditions stated on the back of a printed form, the court
considered the negotiations and the parties' subjective intent. The tribunal
stated that parties wishing to avoid parol evidence problems may include a
merger clause in their contract. 9 ° According to the court, such mergers or

186 See,

e.g., Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (ESGNC) Act,

15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/20Ol/06/esign7.htm; National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecicta/etal299.htm (last visited Apr.
6, 2007).
...See Advisory Council of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Opinion No. 1,Electric Communications UnderCISG, Aug. 15, 2003, available
at http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/docs/CISG-ACopno_ 1.pdf("A contract may be concluded
or evidenced by electronic communications."); see also JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 141 (3d ed. 1999),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/hol3.html; Ulrich G. Schroeter,
Interpretation of 'writing': Comparison between provisions of CISG (Article 13) and
counterpartprovisions of the PrinciplesofEuropeanContractLaw, http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/text/peclcom pI3.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007). However, see Oberster Gerichtshof
[OGH] [Supreme Court] Apr. 24, 1997, 2 Ob 109/97M (Austria), with references to Austrian
scholars and the different opinion of German doctrine and jurisprudence.
188MCC - Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384
(1 lth Cir. 1998); Christian Thiele, Das UN-Kaufrecht vor US-amerikanischen Gerichten,
INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT, Sept. 2002, at 814; Olaf Meyer, Die Anwendung des UNKaufrechts in der US-amerikanischen Gerichtspraxis,PRAXIS DES INTERNTIONAL EN PRIVAT UND VERFAHRENSRECHT, Sept. 2005, at 462.
189 MCC - Marble Ceramic Ctr., 144 F.3d 1384.
9 Id. at 1391 ("Moreover, to the extent parties wish to avoid parol evidence problems they
can do so by including a merger clause in their agreement that extinguishes any and all prior
agreements and understandings not expressed in the writing."); see also ALBERT H. KRITZER,
GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
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integration clauses would exclude evidence outside the contract. The result
arrived at by the court is a correct application of the general rule stated in
Article 8(3) of CISG,'9 which relieves a tribunal deciding a case under the
CISG law from any domestic parol evidence rule or other kind of restrictions
of other means of proof different from a writing. 9 2 That article excuses a
tribunal from the application of domestic rules that might bar the court from
"considering" any evidence that is relevant between the parties,193 and is a
clear direction to the court to admit and consider all other evidence related to
the negotiations which could reveal the parties real intent. 94 This approach
has been seen as a "benchmark against which the progress of future U.S.
decisions on the Convention can be measured."' 9 5 In fact, the case where that
decision was rendered was immediately followed. 196
1. CISG Advisory Council Opinion
The Institute of International Commercial Law of Pace University has
developed an extensive database related to CISG.'97 The Institute has been a

THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 96 (1994).

...CISG, supranote 6, art. 8(3) ("In determining the intent of a party or the understanding
a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have
established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct ofthe parties."). According
to Franco Ferrari, the rule would not be applicable per se. Franco Ferrari, Auslegung von
Parteierklcirungenund- verhaltennach UN-Kaufrecht, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT, Feb.
2003, at 14.
192 HONNOLD, supra note 187, at 121, § 110 ("This added flexibility for interpretation
is
consistent with the growing body of opinion that the 'parol evidence rule' has been an
embarrassment for the administration of modem transactions.").
193 Id.at 170-71, § 110.
194MCC - Marble Ceramic Ctr., 144 F.3d at 1389.
195 Harry M. Flechtner, The U.N. Sales Convention (CISG) and MCC - Marble Ceramic
Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, S.p.A.: The Eleventh Circuit Weighs in on
Interpretation,Subjective Intent, ProceduralLimits to the Convention's Scope, and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 18 J.L. & COM. 259, 287 (1999). Another author praises the tribunal as openmindedly embracing a new methodology regarding its training and indoctrination in domestic
law. Bruno Zeller, The ParolEvidence Rule and the CISG - A ComparativeAnalysis, 36 COMP.
& INT'L L.J. S. AIR. 308 (2003).
196 Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (characterizing the MCC - Marble opinion as "highly persuasive"). In 2001, it
was followed by Shuttle PackagingSys., L.L. C. v. Tsonakis,No. 1:01 -CV-691,2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21630 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001).
"' See Pace Law School, CISG Database, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited Apr. 6,
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strong supporter of the idea of creating an Advisory Council formed by a group
of recognized scholars aimed at promoting the uniform international
interpretation of the CISG. This initiative has been praised.'
The application of the parol evidence doctrine to a sale contract regulated
by the CISG has been considered in Advisory Council Opinion Number 3.199
The main conclusions of the Advisory Council are:
1. The Parol Evidence Rule has not been incorporated into the
CISG. The CISG governs the role and weight to be ascribed to
contractual writing.
2. In some common law jurisdictions, the Plain Meaning Rule
prevents a court from considering evidence outside a seemingly
unambiguous writing for purposes of contractual interpretation.
The Plain Meaning Rule does not apply under the CISG.
3. A Merger Clause, also referred to as an Entire Agreement
Clause, when in a contract governed by the CISG, derogates from
norms of interpretation and evidence contained in the CISG. The
effect may be to prevent a party from relying on evidence of
statements or agreements not contained in the writing. Moreover,
if the parties so intend, a Merger Clause may bar evidence of
trade usages.
However, in determining the effect of such a Merger Clause, the
parties' statements and negotiations, as well as all other relevant
circumstances shall be taken into account. 0 0
The "Comments" to this opinion recognize that in the United States, the parol
evidence rule is concerned with whether the writing involved was a complete
expression of the terms it contained, and whether it is intended as the final
expression of the will of the parties concerning its content.20 ' In the first
2007).
198See Rolf Herber, Eine neue Institution:Der CISG Advisory Council, INTERNATIONALES
HANDELSRECHT, Oct. 2003, at 201-02.
' Advisory Council of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International

Sale of Goods, Opinion No. 3, ParolEvidence Rule, PlainMeaningRule, ContractualMerger
Clause andtheCISG, Oct. 23 2004, availableat http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/docs/CISG-AC_
Opno_3.pdf [hereinafter Opinion No. 3].
200 Id.
201 Id. para. 1.2.5.
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situation, the writing regarded as "integrated" forbids either party to introduce
other evidence which could contradict it.20 2 The opinion contemplates the
merger clause as the stipulation, which usually provides that the writing
represents the entire or the unique agreement of the parties, and that no
document or evidence will be accepted to contradict the writing. As expected,
the opinion recognizes that the parol evidence rule has not been incorporated
into the CISG, which "governs the role and weight to be ascribed to
contractual writing. 2 °3 However, in a controversial paragraph, the opinion
affirms that when a merger clause has been agreed upon in a contract governed
by the CISG rules, such clause has the effect of derogating the CISG's norms
of interpretation. 2 ' The effect of the merger clause, according to the opinion,
"may be to prevent a party from relying on evidence of statements or
agreements not contained in the writing.""2 5 In other words, when the parties
include a merger clause of this kind, they are departing from the rules for the
interpretation of contracts contained in the CISG. As drafted, that conclusion
is not accurate. At least, the consequences of this assertion extend far beyond
what the opinion originally intended. In fact, when reference is made to the
CISG's interpretation rules, the reference necessarily includes the
consideration of Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the CISG as a whole. Accordingly,
when the CISG's text provides in Article 6206 that the parties may depart from
its rules, as is the case of Article 9(2)207 for example, only some of the rules of
interpretation can be modified or set aside by the parties. However, those
norms concerning the international character of the CISG and the need to
promote uniformity like the ones contained in Article 7(1), are principles that
cannot be set aside because they are not susceptible to abrogation by the will

202

Id.

203

Id. para. 2.

204 "A Merger Clause, also referred to as an Entire Agreement Clause, when in a contract

governed by the CISG, derogatesfrom norms of interpretationand evidence contained in the
CISG." Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
205 Opinion No. 3, supra note 199, para. 4.
206 "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12,
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." CISG, supra note 6, art. 6.
207
The parties are considered, unless otherwiseagreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew
or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to,
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade concerned.
Id. art. 9(2) (emphasis added).
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of the parties." 8 If the parties to an international agreement governed by the
CISG include a merger clause of this kind, declaring the signed, written
instrument to be the only agreement between the parties, superseding any other
prior or contemporary instrument, and representing the complete integration
of what they agreed to, notwithstanding the conclusiveness of such clause,
Article 7 of the CISG will continue to apply in order to resolve questions
related to the uniformity and international applicability of any decision
concerned with such a contract. Perhaps the most important proof of the
success of the CISG consists in the uniform application by the national courts
of these internationalized objectives. Germany has produced the most
outstanding examples of this essentially international manner of resolving
CISG disputes." 9 Notwithstanding the general agreement in its conclusion that
the parol evidence rule has not been incorporated into the CISG, it is
regrettable that in one of its first opinions, the Advisory Council failed to
contemplate the consequences of its assertion that in a contract regulated by
the CISG, its rules of interpretation could be excluded by a merger clause.
2. Principlesof UNIDROIT
The objective of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts is to offer to the international arena a set of well-balanced principles
applicable to any international agreement regardless of the legal traditions to
which the parties belong. E"' They can be described as a positive step in the
search for international uniformity, and a valuable tool for interpreting and
supplementing other international commercial instruments."'1 Notwithstanding

201

See M.J. Bonell, Article 7, in COMMENTARY

ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE

1980 VIENNA

SALES CONVENTION, supra note 180, at 93-94; MARIA DEL PILAR PERALES
VISCASILLAS, LA FORMACION DEL CONTRATO EN LA COMPRAVENTA INTERNACIONAL DE

MERCADERJAS 77 (1996); Alberto L. Zuppi, La interpretaci6nen la Convenci6n de Viena de

1980 (CISG - Compraventa internacionalde mercaderias),LA LEY [L.L.], 1997-F-1290.
209 Germany's constitutions have been praised by Peter Schlechtrium, 1O Jahre CISG - Der
Einfluss des UN-Kaufrechts auf die Entwicklung des deutschen und des internationalen
Schuldrechts,INTERNATIONALESHANDELSRECHT, 2001, at 12; and Claude Witz, La Convention

de Vienne sur la vente internationalede marchandisesb I 'preuve de lajurisprudencenaissante,
RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, 1995, at 143, among other scholars.
20 See the expanded version of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, Rome, Unidroit, 2004, in M.J. BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACT LAW, supra note 173, with versions of the Principles in Chinese, English, French,
German, Italian, Russian, and Spanish.
21' Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-FillingRole of the UNIDROIT Principlesin International
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the similarity of objectives and even the treatment of some issues between the
Principles and the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles are not an international
convention or legislative enactment such as the CISG, and will apply only
when the parties incorporate them expressly into the contract.212
The parol evidence rule, as it is known in the United States, has not been
included in a set of rules looking to attain international uniformity. Under the
integration or "merger clause," Article 2.1.17 of the Principles states: "A
contract in writing which contains a clause indicating that the writing
completely embodies the terms on which the parties have agreed cannot be
contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior statements or agreements.
However, such statements or agreements may be used to interpret the
writing., 21 3 In the absence of such a merger clause, Article 1.2 of the
Principles accepts any utterances proved by any means. 2 4 This solution
balances the parol evidence rule with an allowance to admit evidence
subsequent to the writing, but only for the purpose of interpreting the contract.
It is also consistent with the principle stated in Article 4.3(a), 5 which accepts
the preliminary negotiations between the parties as a circumstance that has to
be taken into account when applying the main rules of interpretation. First, the
common intention of the parties or subjective test must be considered; and
second, if the intention cannot be ascertained, a reasonable person standard
must be used.

Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay between the Principlesand the CISG, 69 TUL. L.
REv. 1149, 1152-53 (1995).
212 According to its preamble, the application of the Principles may also be possible in cases
where a general reference to the rules of international commerce or lex mercatoria has been
expressed in the contract, or even as supplementary law when it proves impossible to establish
the applicable law of the contract. It will be seen whether this extension ofthe application of the
Principles is accepted by future doctrine and jurisprudence. See UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts 2004, pmbl., http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/
contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf(last visited Apr. 7, 2007) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Principles].
213 Id. art. 2.1.17.
214 Id. art. 1.2: "Nothing in these Principles requires a contract, statement or any other act to
be made in or evidenced by a particular form. It may be proved by any means, including

witnesses."
215Id. art. 4.3(a); see also UNILEX, Official Comment to the UNIDROIT Principles, http://
www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13637&x=l (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
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B. European Principlesof Contracts
The last example of modern international commercial law to be considered
is the European trend toward the unification of the rules of contracts. The
European Commission of the European Union called for proposals to
modernize and unify the legal systems of contracts, producing two different
drafts: 1) The "Principles of European Contract Law," a project directed by
Ole Lando; and 2) the "European Contract Code," a project directed by
Giuseppe Gandolfi. 216 The former has received the most consistent support.
There was clear consent in the sense that the development of European private
law would depend on the promotion and elaboration of principles
complementing and summarizing national legislation, which were the main
directives of the organs of the European Union and international treaties2 ,7
Again, in a group of legal axioms like the ones analyzed, here the parol
evidence rule has no place. One clause of the Principles of European Contract
Law (PECL)2 18 deals with the good faith and fair dealing that the parties must

26 European Contract Code, http://www.accademiagiusprivatistieuropei.it/docs/EuropeanC
ontr.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
2'
See Christian von Bar, A European Civil Code, InternationalAgreements andEuropean
Directives,in European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, Working Paper:Study of
the Systems of Private Law in the EU with regard to Discriminationand the Creation of a
European Civil Code (June 1999), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
vonbarl.html. The Council of the European Union, at first acting alone, and later together with
the European Parliament, has already issued a group of directives related to consumer protection
and contract law of the member states. The following directives are among the most important:
Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 (EEC), to protect the consumer regarding
contracts negotiated away from business premises; Council Directive 90/314, 1990 O.J. (L 158)
59 (EEC), known as the Package Travel Directive; Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95)
10 (EEC), on unfair terms in consumer contracts; Council Directive 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19
(EC), on the protection of consumers regarding distance contracts; Council Directive 1999/44,
1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EC), on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated
guarantees; Council Directive 2002/65, 2002 O.J. (L 271) (EC), concerning the distance
marketing of consumer financial services and amending some previous directives; Council
Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149/22) 30 (EC), concerning unfair business-to-consumer
commercial practices in the internal market and amending other directives. See also
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,COM
(2001) 398 final (July 11, 2001); Council, Draft Council Report on the Need to Approximate
Member States'Legislationin Civil Matters, Doc. No. 13017/01 (Oct. 29, 2001).
2' It should be mentioned that according to the Principles of European Contract Law in the
revised 1998 version, such Principles may be applied when the parties of the contract agreed that
their contract is governed by the "lex mercatoria." See Commission on European Contract Law,
The Principles of European Contract Law, http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission-on
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observe in relation to their rights and duties; a rule which cannot be limited by
them. 2 9 Freedom of contractual form is dealt with in another clause, which,
in fact, excludes the parol evidence rule. 22' These principles are complemented
by a merger or entire agreement clause,22' and another providing that the
modification of a written contract must also be made in writing.222 A
distinction is proposed dependent on whether the merger clause is the result of
individual negotiation between the contractual parties. If the merger clause is
not the product of a specific negotiation between the parties, the principle
establishes only a rebuttable presumption that any prior statement does not

european contractlaw/PECL%20engelsk/engelskpartI_ogII.htm [hereinafter PECL] (last
visited Apr. 7,2007); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds.,
2000).
219 See PECL, supranote 218, art. 1:201. "Good Faith and Fair Dealing: (1) Each party
must
act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this
duty." Id. See also Matthias E. Storme, GoodFaithand the Contents ofContractsin European
PrivateLaw, 7.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2003).
220 See PECL, supra note 218, art. 2:101. "Conditions for the Conclusion of a Contract:...
(2) A contract need not be concluded or evidenced in writing nor it is subject to any other
requirement as to form. The contract may be proved by any means, including witnesses." Id.
221 See id. art. 2:105.
Merger Clause:
(1) If a written contract contains an individually negotiated clause stating that
the writing embodies all the terms of the contract (a merger clause), any prior
statements, undertakings or agreements which are not embodied in the writing
do not form part of the contract.
(2) If the merger clause is not individually negotiated it will only establish a
presumption that the parties intended that their prior statements, undertakings
or agreements were not to form part of the contract. This rule may not be
excluded or restricted.
(3) The parties' prior statements may be used to interpret the contract. This
rule may not be excluded or restricted except by an individually negotiated
clause.
(4) A party may by its statements or conduct be precluded from asserting a
merger clause to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied on them.
Id.
d.See id. art. 2:106.
Written Modification Only:
(1) A clause in a written contract requiring any modification or ending by
agreement to be made in writing establishes only a presumption that an
agreement to modify or end the contract is not intended to be legally binding
unless it is in writing.
(2) A party may by its statements or conduct be precluded from asserting such
a clause to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied on them.
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form part of the contract. If a clause in a written contract declares that the
writing embodies all the terms agreed upon by the parties in a specific
negotiated merger or integration clause, any prior statements, undertakings, or
agreements which are not embodied in the writing will not be regarded as
forming part of the contract, although they may be used for interpreting the
contract. When the parties are faced with clear evidence of a prior agreed
term, which was not included in the document, that term will be binding. As
in several codes of the civil law tradition, the PECL includes a contra
proferentem clause for construing a clause against its drafter.22 3 Unlike the
U.C.C. and most of the civil codes, the PECL does not establish a money limit
under which a writing is not necessary to prove the existence of the contract.
On March 23, 2006, the European Parliament rendered a resolution
reiterating its conviction that a uniform internal market cannot be fully
functional without harmonizing the civil law, but called for respecting different
legal traditions among member States. 224 The European Union's group of
experts is working upon a "Common Frame of Reference" (CFR) in European
contract law, which will help to revise the existing law, and a draft is expected
by the end of 2007.225 It is doubtful that any reference to the parol evidence
rule will be considered in the frame of reference, and the last surviving
vestiges of the rule will remain confined to simple domestic cases with the
limitations and great number of exceptions of the prohibition summarized in
this Article.226

223
224

See id. art. 5:103.
See Hugh Beale, The European Commission 's Common Frame of Reference Project: A

ProgressReport, 2 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 303 (2006).
225 See European Parliament Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament and the Council-A More Coherent European Contract Law-An Action
Plan, EUR. PARE. Doc. (COM) (2003) 68; see also Workshop of the Network of Member State
Experts on European Contract Law, May, 31, 2005, Summary, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
consumers/consint/safe_shop/fair bus_pract/cont law/experts membstates3105_en.pdf.
226 See discussion supraPart III. In Ireland, the other independent common law member of
the European Union, the rule has been seen as "archaic," and as being virtually abolished
through various judicial decisions. RAYMOND J. FRIEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 171 (2d ed.
2000). One explanation has been the decline of the institution of the jury in civil cases. ROBERT
CLARK, CONTRACT LAW INIRELAND 112 (4th ed. 1998). See also ROBERT CLARK, CONTRACT
63 (2d ed. 1986).
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V. CONCLUSION

Since the Countess ofRutland's Casedecided in 1604,227 the parol evidence
rule has suffered considerable changes by reducing the extent of its application
through the admission of endless exceptions. After revisiting the main forms
adopted by this common law principle and its equivalents in the systems
derived from Roman law, as well as the lack of regard for the rule in modem
lex mercatoria,it seems possible to conclude that there remains only a tame
hybrid, domestically applied in some jurisdictions, of the rule as it was
originally conceived. The application of the rule has considerably reduced and
narrowed its scope when compared with the solutions shaped by other
international principles. Among the countries and jurisdictions considered in
this research, only the United Kingdom and South Africa belong to the group
that has not ratified the CISG. In England, where the parol evidence rule was
originally used, the large number of exceptions allowed by case law invites
inquiry into whether the rule has survived. Even Scotland, a mixed
jurisdiction, has shown a clear trend toward following the path of the
international sales conventions' extensive interpretation in the admission of
evidence. Only in the United States does the rule continue to be domestically
considered, but only within the clear boundaries shown in this research.
Certainly, the concept of the written document today is also different from
the one used when the rule was in full application. Traditionally, a written
document usually implied a writing in paper. Today, electronic documents and
transactions are terms of common use, and expressions like EDI (electronic
data interchange), electronic commerce, electronic records, or e-mails are part
of our lives. The extraordinary changes in communications, the common use
of computers in the legal profession, the advances of technology, and the easy
global access to sources of information are alternatives that help to show the
parties' true intentions more accurately. This conclusion approaches closely
the civil law understanding of the force of extrinsic evidence to clarify a
written agreement, rather than the common law traditional apprehension of
looking beyond the face of the document because of the parol evidence rule.

227 (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B.). This case is presumed by some legal authors to be one of

the first appearances of the rule. See R.H.V., Note, Sales-Integrity of Written Instrument
Violated by the Admission ofPriorAgreement, 15 VA. L. REV. 502 (1929); Lawrence M. Solan,
The Written Contract as Safe Harborfor Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 91
(2001).

